Nombreux sont les artistes qui, au cours des années soixante, ont écrit pour la revue Artforum, qui demeure, encore aujourd’hui, l’une des plus importantes publications artistiques. Certains de ces écrits s’inscrivent dans des formats journalistiques, quelques-uns sont des compositions faisant appel à des catégories littéraires, d’autres suivent les formes académiques de l’essai et de la dissertation et, enfin, s’ajoutent à ceux-ci des travaux conceptuels ayant le statut d’œuvres d’art. Cet article étudie la manière dont cette revue a contribué à rendre (...) visible la parole des artistes entre 1962 et 1967, du moment de son émergence jusqu’au numéro d’été où figurent des textes incontournables pour le monde de l’art, tels que « Notes on Sculpture » de Robert Morris, « Towards the Development of an Air Terminal Site » de Robert Smithson, ou encore « Paragraphs on Conceptual Art » de Sol LeWitt. D’après une analyse effectuée sur les cinq volumes parus au cours de cette période, un total de 36 % des articles a été rédigé par des artistes. (shrink)

As a 2006 Institute of Medicine report highlights, surprisingly little empirical attention has been paid to how prisoners arrive at decisions to participate in modern research. With our study, we aimed to fill this gap by identifying a more comprehensive range of factors as reported by prisoners themselves during semistructured interviews. Our participants described a diverse range of motives, both favoring and opposing their eventual decision to join. Many are well-recognized considerations among nonincarcerated clinical research participants, including a desire for (...) various forms of personal benefit, altruism, and concern about study risks and inconveniences. However, a number of influences seem unique to prisoners. Participants did not report that they were not coerced into enrolling, and they have even been under pressure not to enroll. However, many sought to enroll in order to obtain access to better health care, raising a concern about whether they were unfairly exploited. (shrink)

This article provides an analysis of the perception of fear in nightlife spaces, its relationship with sexual violence and the strategies that young people implement to combat these situations in two provinces of Andalusia, Spain. To this end, qualitative research was carried out through in-depth interviews and discussion groups with 73 boys and girls between the ages of 16 and 22. The article asserts that there are gender differences in the spaces of fear. Girls are the ones who experience fear (...) the most when they walk alone, and at specific times – a feeling that is made worse in specific public spaces. The study results show that girls’ fear is associated with sexual assault and boys’ fear with robberies or fights. Results show that three main types of strategies are used in the face of these fears: avoidance, confronting risks and empowerment. All these strategies include the use of new communication technologies. This article seeks to provide a theoretical contribution to enhancing a gender perspective in the field of urban geography. (shrink)

Most cognitive scientists nowadays tend to think that at least some of the mind’s capacities are the product of biological evolution, yet important conceptual problems remain for all scientists in order to be able to speak coherently of mental or cognitive systems as having evolved naturally. Two of these important problems concern the articulation of adequate, interesting, and empirically useful concepts of homology and variation as applied to cognitive systems. However, systems in cognitive science are usually understood as functional systems (...) of some sort. Thus, to be able to talk about functional systems being homologous requires having a solid, adequate, and empirically articulated concept of functional homology—and the same is true about functional variation. Here I construct an original concept of functional homology that, in my view, adequately systematizes a number of actual uses of the word “functional homology” in a variety of biological disciplines and in ethology. I also propose a number of criteria for the empirical application of the concept that are analogous to the criteria that are currently used in comparative biology, ethology, and molecular developmental genetics. Then I construct a concept of functional variation on the basis of this concept of homology. (shrink)

Research has revealed that sex education policies are informed by national and local struggles over the meanings and consequences of gender, race, sexuality, and class categories. However, few studies have considered how policies are enacted in the classroom production of sex education to support or challenge gender, racial, sexual, and class hierarchies. This article draws on data obtained through semistructured in-depth interviews with 40 Latina youth to explore how heteronormativity, sexism, and racism operate together to structure the content and delivery (...) of school-based sex education. Findings suggest that some Latina youth encounter racialized heterogendered constructions and experiences that limit their access to sex-education-related information and reinforce existing inequalities. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what (...) appears to be some radical surgery on the concept of knowledge; a radical surgery that, as I show, is probably unnecessary to avoid dreaming skepticism. Finally, I sketch some independent considerations why I think that the hyperbolic skeptic's dreaming argument is not acceptable. Ernesto Sosa propone dos maneras de responder al escéptico del sueño. En este ensayo argumento que su primera propuesta, según la cual no tenemos creencias en los sueños, no parece ser una buena respuesta en contra de ninguno de los escepticismos del sueño, de los cuales distingo dos tipos: el hiperbólico y el realista. También argumento que su segunda propuesta para responder al escéptico del sueño, en la que argumenta que el conocimiento perceptual sí cuenta como conocimiento animal, quizá resulte exitosa; sin embargo, ésta requiere llevar a cabo una cirugía radical en el concepto de conocimiento; una cirugía que, como muestro, es probablemente innecesaria para evitar el escepticismo del sueño. Finalmente bosquejo algunas razones independientes por las cuales considero que el argumento del escéptico hiperbólico del sueño no es aceptable. (shrink)

This is the introduction of the Synthese Topical Collection Epistemological Issues in Neurodivergence and Atypical Cognition written by the guest editors. In order to justify the relevance of the topic, a minimum context is given on the notions of neurodivergence as well as some brief remarks on the neurodiversity advocacy movement. This serves as a basis to establish the importance of increasing the scope of epistemology to include issues that do not fit in the descriptions of typical subjects and cognitive (...) processes. (shrink)

Aquí argumento que algunas propuestas recientes de caracterizar una noción de lo innato teóricamente útil usando conceptos de la biología padecen serios problemas conceptuales. También defiendo una propuesta propia, de inspiración biológica, la cual pretende capturar las formas en que se usa el término 'innato' en algunas disciplinas cognitivas.

There is an argument that has recently been deployed in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly (or even exclusively) composed of cognitive modules; an argument that draws from some ideas and concepts of evolutionary and of developmental biology. In a nutshell, the argument concludes that a mind that is massively composed of cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular (henceforth, c-modular) is more evolvable than a mind that is not c-modular (or that is scarcely c-modular), since a cognitive mechanism (...) that is c-modular is likely to be biologically modular (henceforth, b-modular), and b-modular characters are more evolvable (e.g., Sperber 2002, Carruthers 2005). In evolutionary biology, the evolvability of a character in an organism is understood as the “organism’s capacity to facilitate the generation of non-lethal selectable phenotypic variation from random mutation” with respect to that character. Here I will argue that the notion of cognitive modularity needed to make this argument plausible will have to be understood in terms of the biological notion of variational independence; that is, it will have to be understood in such a way that a cognitive feature is c-modular only if few or no other morphological changes (cognitive and not) are significantly correlated with variations of that feature arising in members of the relevant population. I will also argue that all –except for (possibly) one—of the connotations contained in a cluster of notions of cognitive modularity widely accepted in some of the mainstream currents of thought in classical cognitive science, are simply irrelevant to the argument. In order to argue for this, I will have to examine the question as to whether there are any strong theoretical connections between (1) those connotations and (2) notions of modularity accepted in biology, specially in evolutionary and in developmental biology, that are thought to be most relevant to arguments to the effect that biological modularity enhances evolvability. (shrink)

I examine an argument that has recently appeared in the cognitive science literature in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly composed of Fodorian-type cognitive modules; an argument that concludes that a mind that is massively composed of classical cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular is more evolvable than a mind that is not cognitively modular, since a cognitive mechanism that is cognitively modular is likely to be biologically modular, and biologically modular characters are more evolvable. I argue that (...) the notion of cognitive modularity needed to make this argument plausible will have to be understood in terms of the biological notion of variational independence, as follows: a cognitive feature is cognitively modular only if few or no other morphological changes are significantly correlated with variations of that feature arising in members of the relevant population as a result of ontogeny. I also argue that most of the connotations contained in a cluster of notions of classical cognitive modularity are, as far as we know, irrelevant to the argument, and that only the presence of selective impairments—also known as cognitive dissociations—can be considered as strong indicators of the type of modularity that genuinely enhances evolvability. (shrink)

En este ensayo presento brevemente la propuesta de un concepto de homología funcional, junto con sus criterios empíricos. Argumento que dicho concepto es necesario para la articulación de una ciencia cognitiva evolutiva rigurosa y completa. Luego considero la pregunta sobre cuál de los dos principales conceptos de función que han sido desarrollados por filósofos de la biología —a saber, el análisis sistémico o el seleccionista— es el que encaja de mejor manera con mi concepto de homología funcional, y concluyo que (...) la noción de tipo sistémico es la más coherente con dicho concepto. (shrink)

En el presente artículo argumento que algunos de los descubrimientos empíricos relativamente recientes en la biología del desarrollo nos llevan a abandonar ciertos conceptos de lo innato, en particular, aquellos que llamaremos 'internistas'. También examino la adecuación de tres caracterizaciones de lo innato propuestas recientemente que toman en cuenta los descubrimientos empíricos antes mencionados y pretenden recoger un núcleo importante de las connotaciones y afirmaciones asociadas a lo innato en algunas disciplinas empíricas. Además, argumento que dos de estas caracterizaciones son (...) inadecuadas por razones diversas, y que es más plausible considerar la tercera como una explicación del concepto de un rasgo fenotípico heredado. /// In this paper I argue that some relatively recent empirical findings in developmental biology lead us to abandon some concepts of innateness, in particular those which we shall call 'internalist concepts'. I also examine three characterizations of innateness that have been recently proposed--characterizations which take into account those empirical findings and are attempts to explain some of the most important connotations and assertions associated to the word 'innate' as it is used in some empirical disciplines. It is also argued that two of these characterizations are inadequate for various reasons, and that it is more plausible to consider the third characterization as an explication of the concept of an inherited phenotypic trait. (shrink)

From a gender perspective, female immigrant domestic caregivers have been particularly impacted during the COVID-19 pandemic: first, as female immigrants, and second, due to their work within the domestic care sector, which has been so badly affected in this pandemic. This study investigates the emotions and experiences of 15 female Latin American immigrant domestic workers, caregivers in five Andalusian cities who were cohabiting with their employees/patients during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, using qualitative research through in-depth interviews and life stories. The (...) results show the moral debt accrued by the caregivers with the family who employ them, while worsening the physical and psychological health of many of the caregivers, due to both work overload and fear of the global pandemic. (shrink)

En las ciencias cognoscitivas, existe una teoría con respecto a la arquitectura computacional de la mente conocida como el modularismo masivo. Esta teoría sostiene que la mente está en su mayoría constituida por mecanismos que son cognoscitivamente modulares. Algunos de los defensores de esta teoría proponen un argumento cuya conclusión es que es muy probable que mecanismos que son cognoscitivamente muy modulares sean más evolucionables que aquellos mecanismos que no son cognoscitivamente modulares. Aquí muestro que para poder defender plausiblemente esta (...) conclusión es necesario añadir a la noción de modularidad cognoscitiva la siguiente característica: "Un sistema cognoscitivo S de organismos de una población P es cognoscitivamente modular sólo si S es variacionalmente modular en P." Defiendo también la idea que una de las características que normalmente se asocian al concepto de modularidad cognoscitiva-i.e., la noción de doble disociación cognoscitiva-es muy cercana a la idea de modularidad variacional. Adicionalmente, argumento que no hay razones positivas, y sí algunas razones negativas, para pensar que las otras características usualmente asociadas al concepto de modularidad cognoscitiva-tales como la especificidad de dominio o la especialización funcional-coadyuven a la evolucionabilidad de los módulos cognoscitivos. In the cognitive sciences, there is a theory concerning the computational architecture of the mind known as massive modularity. This theory holds that the mind is constituted mostly by cognitive modules. Some of the defenders of this theory have put forward an argument whose conclusion is that it is very likely that those mechanisms that are cognitively very modular are more evolvable than mechanisms that are not cognitively modular. Here I show that a plausible defense of this conclusion requires us to add to the usual notion of cognitive modularity the following characteristic: "A cognitive system S of organism of a population P is cognitively modular only if S is variationally modular in P." I also defend the view that one of the characteristics normally associated to the concept of cognitive modularity-namely, the notion of a double dissociation-is conceptually close to the concept of variational modularity. Additionally, I argue that there are not positive reasons-while there are some negative ones-to think that the other characteristics usually associated to cognitive modularity, such as domain specificity or functional specialization, enhance the evolvability of cognitive modules. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that an adequate and coherent account of Descartes’ concepts of mental representation, ideas, clarity and distinctness, obscurity and confusion, and material falsity requires that one takes Descartes seriously whenever he makes a distinction between what an idea appears to represent and what it actually represents, and that one understands an idea’s representing a thing in terms of the objective existence in the mind of the essence of that thing. The paper also contains a logical articulation (...) of most of these views, in a manner which shows overall coherence. (shrink)

In this paper I present a proposal to characterize in a precise manner the notions of domain specificity and of a bias in connection with rules of inference, as such notions are used in the psychology of human reasoning, and argue —against many cognitive psychologists— that there are no strong con..

En los Esbozos Pirrónicos, Sexto Empírico adelanta un argumento similar al sueño de Descartes, que parece comprometer a Sexto con una especie de relativismo protagórico. En este artículo examino este argumento en el contexto de otros pasajes de Sexto y propongo una interpretación que muestra que el escepticismo que uno puede trazar desde este argumento es tan radical como el de Descartes, pero nunca podrá considerarse como un argumento relativista. Muestro que Sexto comete un error crucial al describir la posición (...) de Protágoras y la suya, un error que podría llevarle a uno a concluir falsamente que Sexto es un relativista protagórico. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the relationship between an extensive skepticism concerning the existence of the world and the concept of mental representation in Sextus Empiricus and Descartes. In Chapter 1, it is argued, against the traditional interpretation, that Sextus does espouse such an extensive skepticism; that, at the same time, he is using a very strong causal concept of experience according to which the object of the experience is 'the cause' of the experience; and that he can consistently embrace these two (...) positions because his skepticism is flexible enough that he can always turn around and undermine the very presuppositions implicit in the use of a concept, which he has previously used to prove a skeptical point. Chapter 1 also includes an examination of Descartes's skepticism in the First Mediation, and it is argued that this skepticism undermines not only the Scholastico-Aristotelian causal view of mental representation, but also the weaker principle to the effect that we cannot have representations of simple things that compose those complex representations are caused by similar simple things. But Descartes's skepticism in the First Meditation is not as flexible as Sextus's. Hence, he cannot overturn his skeptical arguments by using any strong causal principle of mental representations. Chapters 2 and 3 together include an extensive defense of the view that the causal principle that Descartes uses in the Meditations to prove the existence of God and of physical objects is so weak as to allow that all our ideas--except the idea of God--are generated by our minds, and that this is the only principle he uses and needs in the Meditations and elsewhere. To this end, Chapter 2 examines the concepts of objective reality, material falsity, etc. It includes a defense of an interpretation of Descartes's view of ideas, according to which ideas have two levels of content: a seemingly representational and a truly representational. I relate this interpretation to his views on objective reality, material falsity, sensible qualities, the causes of innate ideas, and the nature of sensory perception and imagination. (shrink)

Here I develop an interpretation of Descartes' theory of ideas which differs from the standard reading in that it incorporates a distinction between what an idea appears to represent and what it represents. I argue that this interpretation not only finds support in the texts but also is required to explain a large number of assertions in Descartes which would otherwise appear irremediably obscure or problematic. For example, in my interpretation it is not puzzling that Descartes responds to Arnauld's difficulty (...) concerning the notion of material falsity by drawing a distinction between that to which an idea conforms (that of which the idea truly is) and that to which it refers. Furthermore, my interpretation also explains how Descartes can intelligibly reject the view that saying that something is clear and distinct is equivalent to saying that it is obvious. Finally, I argue that my interpretation allows Descartes' view that we have some sort of internal access to the objects actually represented by an idea. (shrink)

La violencia contra la mujer en la pareja es un fenómeno registrado en las sociedades a lo largo de la historia. Con el f in de averiguar cuáles son las causas que favorecen su aparición se han desarrollado teorías desde diferentes perspectivas —psicológica, socioló- gica y feminista, principalmente— que han tratado que determinar cuáles son los factores que aumentan el riesgo de que exista este tipo de violencia. El propósito de este artículo es exponer los postulados de las principales las (...) teorías criminológicas que han tratado el maltrato en la pareja en el ámbito internacional. Conocer las variables de riesgo de esta problemática social puede servir para diseñar políticas publicas de prevención y erradicación de la violencia contra la mujer en la pareja. (shrink)

Here we defend the view that one ought to categorize and classify at least some mental disorders as clusters of interrelated dysfunctions of (usually, several) cognitive capacities – that is, the kinds of capacities that are postulated in cognitive science; capacities that are understood as entities that are primarily individuated in cognitive-functional terms (CF-systems); systems that have a set of peculiar properties in their manner of operation when processing information or representations. Usually, some of the mental disorders postulated in psychiatry (...) are clinically heterogeneous with respect to their symptoms, and tend to be comorbid – that is, one disorder is often accompanied by other disorders – for example, schizophrenia often comes with major depression. We argue that describing the manner in which CF-systems operate within themselves and with other CF-systems as well as with stimuli and other kinds of information can best explain why certain mental disorders are very heterogeneous with respect to their symptoms, and why comorbidity is so frequent among these disorders. A consequence is that both within-category heterogeneity and comorbodity are not necessarily indications of defective classifications but are rather a consequence of the actual cognitive functional architecture itself and are therefore to be expected in these cases. (shrink)

Firm managers play an important role in the implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions. Education is emerging as the key factor in developing a sense of moral responsibility amongst the business students who will eventually become company managers and decision makers. The aim of this research is, thus, twofold. First, to analyze the existence of a direct positive correlation between university students’ perception of CSR and its impact on business performance; and second, to examine the extent to which two (...) factors (advantages brought by CSR and responsibilities toward stakeholders) act as mediation variables in the aforementioned correlation. The analysis was performed with a sample of 390 business‐related university students. Amongst the potential contributions made by this study we can highlight the possibility of knowing future managers’ way of thinking and of knowing the aspects where educational centers might improve their CSR teaching. (shrink)

En el presente estudio se aborda una serie de textos talmúdicos, donde los elementos mágicos juegan un papel importante dentro de la realidad rabínica. La sensibilidad para explicar estos pasajes la podemos encontrar, en la literatura contemporánea, en la corriente conocida como “realismo mágico” o “lo real maravilloso”. Las obras que se han elegido como referencia son Cien años de soledad de G. García Márquez y Pedro Páramo de J. Rulfo, pues además de ser dos novelas cumbre en la narrativa (...) hispanoamericana, están traducidas a la mayoría de las lenguas occidentales. Dos son los ámbitos en los que se centra el estudio: la muerte y el infierno con sus respectivas representaciones en el mundo de los vivos, ya que tanto en la novela latino-americana como en el universo rabínico, los demonios, los mediadores y todo tipo de seres intermedios se relacionan con los hombres a través de una realidad mítica. Así pues, a pesar de ser dos literaturas alejadas en el tiempo y el espacio, parecen tener una sensibilidad similar a la hora de abordar las cuestiones del Inframundo, sin abandonar la realidad y a su vez sin perder de vista la espontaneidad de la cultura tradicional y popular, que tanto gusta de los elementos mágicos. (shrink)

Las naciones y pueblos indígenas presentan preocupantes índices respecto a la salud, así como otras carencias como la pérdida de sus tierras, la alimentación, la educación y, en general, el ejercicio de sus derechos, consagrados por organizaciones internacionales como la ONU y la OMS-OPS. En Ecuador, de acuerdo con el orden jurídico constitucional, se han instrumentado políticas de salud que incluyen el lineamiento general de un enfoque intercultural de la atenciónprimaria que incorpora los saberes y prácticas ancestrales. Mediante una revisión (...) documental se examina la situación actual de la salud y la atención primaria entre las etnias indígenas del Ecuador. De este análisis se desprenden consideraciones para las políticas públicas de salud, la formación intercultural de los profesionales de los equipos de salud y, en especial, la articulación de las creencias, saberes y prácticas de la cultura de las etnias para la atención primaria de salud. Palabras Clave: Etnia, nacionalidad indígena, pueblo indígena, derecho a la salud, atención primaria. Referencias [1]Asamblea General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, «Resolución 48/134 de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de los pueblos y naciones indígenas,» de Asamblea General Resolución 48/134, New York, 2009. [2]Organización Panamericana de la Salud, «Derechos Humanos y Salud de los pueblos indígenas,» Organización Panamericana de la Salud, New York, 2008. [3]Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas. Manual para las instituciones nacionales de Derechos Humanos, Nueva York: Alto Comisionado de los Derechos Humanos de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, 2013. [4]C. Torres Parodi y M. Bolis, «Evolución del concepto etnia/raza y su impacto en la formulación de políticas públicas para la equidad,» Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, vol. 22, nº 3, pp. 405-414, 2007. [5]IIDH-OPS, «Salud indígena y derechos humanos,» OPS, Quito, 2006. [6]Organización Panamericana de la Salud, «Iniciativa de la Salud para los Pueblos Indígenas. Lineamientos estratégicos. Plan de acción 2003-2007,» Organización Mundial de la Salud, Quito, 2003. [7]Consejo Mundial de las Iglesias, «Segunda Asamblea Mundial de la Salud de los Pueblos,» Consejo Mundial de las Iglesias, Quito, 2005. [8]Grupo Internacional de Trabajo sobre asuntos indígenas, Instituto de Promoción de Estudios Sociales, Fundación Diversidad, «El Derecho a la Salud de los pueblos indígenas en aislamiento y en contacto inicial,» Grupo Internacional de Trabajo sobre Asuntos Indígenas, Quito, 2007. [9]Organización Panamericana de la Salud, «Salud de los pueblos indígenas de las Américas,» OPS, Quito, 1998. [10]Organización Inernacional del Trabajo, «Convenio número 169 de la OIT. sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales: hacia un futuro inclusivo, sostenible y justo.,» OIT, New York, 2019. [11]L. Almeida Vera, «Fundamentación del modelo de gestión intercultural ecuatoriana en la atención primaria desalud,» Medisam, vol. 8, nº 18, pp. 46-61, 2014. [12]Organización Internacional del Trabajo, «Implementación del Convenio núm 169 de la OIT sobre los pueblos indígenas y tribales: Hacia un futuro inclusivo, sostenible y justo,» OIT, New York, 2019. [13]C. Eysaguirre, Proceso de incorporación de la medicina tradicional, alternativa y complementaria en las prácticas oficiales de la salud. Tesis Magister Antropología, Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2016. [14]Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación, «Sobre la salud y la seguridad de los pueblos indígenas en riesgo debido al coronavirus,» FAO, New York, 2020. [15]Enlace Continental de Mujeres Indígenas de las Américas, Alianza de Mujeres Indígenas de Centroamérica y México, Red de Mujeres Indígenas Asiáticas, Organización de Mujeres Indígenas Africanas, «Llamado colectivo de las mujeres indógenas ante el COVID 19. Foro Internacional de Mujeres Indígenas,» ONU, New York, 2020. [16]Laboratorio de interculturalidad FLACSO Ecuador, Etnohistoria de los pueblos y nacionalidades originarias del Ecuador, Quito: FLACSO Ecuador, 2015. [17]UNICEF, Nacionalidades y pueblos indígenas. Políticas interculturales en Ecuador, Quito: UNICEF, 2009. [18]República del Ecuador, «Constitución de la República del Ecuador,» de 2008, Quito, 2008. [19]S. Ramírez Hita, «Políticas de salud basadas en el concepto de multiculturalidad: los centros de salud intercultural en el altiplano boliviano,» Avá Revista de Antropología, vol. 14, nº 2, pp. 1-28, 2009. [20]E. Arteaga, M. San Sebastián y A. Amores, «Construcción participativa de indicadores de la implementación del modelo de salud intercultural en el cantón Loreto, Ecuador,» Saúde em Debate, vol. 36, nº 94, pp. 402-413, 2012. [21]L. Véliz Rojas, A. Bianchetti Saavedra y M. Silva Fernández, «Competencias interculturales en la atención primaria de salud: un desafío para la educación superior frente a contextos de diversidad cultural,» Cuadernos de Saúde Pública, vol. 35, nº 1, pp. 62-71, 2019. [22]C. Walsh, Interculturalidad: Estado, sociedad: luchas decoloniales de nuestra época, Quito: Abya Yala UASB, 2015. [23]E. Ortiz Prado y G. Ceballos Serra, «Marco estratégico para la protección de los pueblos indígenas en aislamiento voluntario y contacto inicial. Consultoría sobre situación de salud de los pueblos indígenas en aislamiento y contacto inicial en el Ecuador,» Organización del Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica, Quito, 2014. [24]J. Betancurt, A. Green, J. Carrillo y Anane-Firempong, «Defining Cultural competence: a practical framework for adressing racial/ethnic disparities in health and health care,» Public Health, vol. 118, nº 2, pp. 293-302, 2016. [25]R. Ceballos, A. Amores y R. Rojas, Prestación de servicios de salud en zonas con pueblos indígenas, Quito: Programa Regional de Salud de los Pueblos Indígenas, 2009. [26]L. Pereira de Melo, «A contemporaneidade da teoría do cuidado cultural de Madeleine Leininger: una perspectiva geohistórica,» Ensaios e Ciencia: ciencias biológicas, agrarias e da Saúde, vol. 14, nº 2, pp. 21-32, 2010. [27]C. Rohrbach-Viadas, «Introducción a la teoría de los cuidados culturales enfermeros de la diversidad y la universalidad de Madeleine Leininger,» Revista Cultura del cuidado, vol. 2, nº 3, pp. 32-46, 1998. [28]O. Aguilar Guzmán, I. Carrasco González, M. García Piña, A. Saldívar y R. Ostiguín Meléndez, «Madeleine Leininger: análisis de sus fundamentos teóricos,» Revista de Enfermería Universitaria, vol. 4, nº 2, pp. 26-32, 2007. (shrink)

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in (...) the light of claims of “thought insertion” in schizophrenic patients. The paper aims to defend a Shoemaker-like line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. Methodologically, the paper argues that to properly address these issues the all-inclusive term “thought” should be avoided, and specific types of thoughts countenanced. (shrink)

The veins are cuticular structures that differentiate in precise patterns in insect wings. The genetic and molecular basis of vein pattern formation in Drosophila melanogaster is beginning to be unravelled with the identification and characterisation of the gene products that position the veins and direct their differentiation. Genes affecting the veins fall into two groups: transcriptional regulators that specify individual veins, and members of signalling pathways involved in patterning and differentiation of the veins. The elaboration of the vein pattern is (...) progressive in time and requires the coordinated activities of these signalling pathways and the transcription factors regulated by them. Although the network of genetic interactions that determine vein cell fate is well understood, very little is known about the cellular biology underlying the acquisition of vein histotype. BioEssays 25:443–451, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

La teoría “coaseana” del derecho, y el Análisis Económico del Derecho en general, asumen implícitamente la veracidad de dos premisas comportamentales: la “exogeneidad de la preferencia” y la “independencia de la referencia”. Este artículo señala algunas objeciones a estas premisas, luego evidencia algunas implicaciones acerca de: cómo el AED –desde un punto de vista positivo– pronostica los comportamientos de las personas y los efectos de las normas jurídicas entendidas como incentivos, y cómo, –desde un punto de vista normativo– la teoría (...) económica sugiere las decisiones del juez o del legislador. El artículo además presenta los desafíos a los que se enfrenta el AED al aceptarse la premisa comportamental de que las personas valoran los derechos individuales, no en términos absolutos, sino en términos relativos, comparados con un punto de referencia. (shrink)

O presente texto não pretende ser um artigo analítico sobre Bourdieu mas um ensaio escrito da perspectiva de uma cientista política sobre as possibilidades abertas pela teoria desenvolvida pelo sociólogo francês para o estudo dos fenômenos da política. Com este propósito trabalharei com as noções de campo e capitais.

The truth of a statement depends on the world in two ways: what the statement says is true if the world is as the statement says it is; on the other hand, what the expressions in the statement mean depends on what the world is like (for instance, on what conventions are in place). Each of these two kinds of dependence of truth on the world corresponds to one of the dimensions on the two-dimensional semantic framework, developed in the 1970’ (...) in the work of Evans, Kaplan, Kripke and Stalnaker. The introduction provides a systematic overview of the framework, the ideas of its earlier originators, recent developments and criticism. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume. (shrink)

Class, race and gender are three of the most salient factors in society. They determine to an important extent the opportunities we have, e.g. to access public.

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. How should a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature look like? In spite of extended discussion of the issue since it was brought to the attention of the philosophical community in the late fifties by Quine (1956), we are far from having a plausible response. Discussing the matter in connection with the status (...) of the Kripkean category of the contingent a priori, Donnellan (1979) argued that what can be properly classified as knowable a priori about utterances like those involving ‘one meter’ or ‘Neptune’ famously proposed by Kripke (1980) cannot be the very same singular content that is contingent he distinguished to that end between knowing a true proposition expressed by an utterance, and knowing that an utterance expresses a true proposition. Evans (1979) replied that, for a very specific sort of cases involving “descriptive names”, a related proto-two-dimensionalist account should be preferred, on which it is not the singular contingent content, but rather a general descriptive one which is knowable a priori. In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion (2000, 2001) has recently attacked Donnellan's proposal, arguing in favour of the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke's claim: in the relevant cases, the very same singular content can be both contingent and knowable a priori. This paper appeals to a generalized version of two-dimensional semantics to advance an account of the Kripkean cases along the lines of Evans's, and argues that Jeshion's compelling arguments against Donnellan's view do not apply to this version. (shrink)

Le langage de la poésie appelle une attention particulière, car son étrangeté même témoigne d’un rapport au réel fort différent des pratiques de la langue, dans la vie quotidienne ou dans le travail scientifique. En s’aidant de la référence au Vide et aux perspectives puisées dans la tradition chinoise, Maldiney développe cette philosophie propre à la poésie à partir des oeuvres d’André du Bouchet et de Francis Ponge. Son analyse donne ainsi à l’art poétique une responsabilité rarement mise en valeur (...) par rapport au réel : un rapport à la fois d’intimité et de proximité. (shrink)